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A PRO DEBTOR AND MAJORITY APPROACH 
TO THE “AUTOMATIC STAY” PROVISION OF 
THE BANKRUPTCY CODE—IN RE COWEN 
INCORRECTLY DECIDED 
Abstract: On February 27, 2017, in In re Cowen, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit held that only affirmative actions to either obtain posses-
sion or exercise control over property of the bankruptcy estate constitute vio-
lations of the automatic stay provision. In doing so, the court concluded that 
the passive retention of an asset that was acquired pre-petition was not a viola-
tion of the automatic stay, and that the creditor had no obligation to relinquish 
the asset to the bankruptcy estate. This Comment argues that the Tenth Circuit 
misinterpreted the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code, disre-
garding clear policy considerations and legislative history, which evidence 
Congress’s intent behind the provision’s 1984 amendment. 
INTRODUCTION 
The bankruptcy system is a “system of federal law, enacted by Con-
gress.”1 When a person (or municipality) files for bankruptcy, it generally 
means they are in a state in which they cannot repay money they owe to 
creditors.2 Bankruptcy can be filed either voluntarily by the debtor or invol-
                                                                                                                           
 1 JACK AYER, BANKRUPTCY OVERVIEW: ISSUES, LAW AND POLICY 7 (5th ed. 2006). The 
goals of the bankruptcy system are threefold: to provide debtors with a “fresh start” by discharg-
ing their debts, to allow those who can financially reorganize a chance to do so, and to provide an 
equitable set of rules for the distribution of the debtor’s property (or its value). See Weber v. 
SEFCU (In re Weber), 719 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 2013) (discussing the automatic stay and turnover 
provisions and how they enforce the goals of bankruptcy, which include relief to the debtor and 
allowing them a “fresh start”); Thompson v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 566 F.3d 699, 706 
(7th Cir. 2009) (stating that both corporate and personal reorganization are aimed at assisting the 
debtor in “regain[ing] his financial foothold” in order to pay off his debts); see also United States 
v. Whiting Pools Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983) (stating that the goal of reorganization through 
bankruptcy is to allow businesses to continue running in order to pay off debts to creditors); 
BANKR. JUDGES DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, BANKRUPTCY BASICS, 6 
(Nov. 2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/bankbasics-post10172005.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2J7G-9TDZ] (citing Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)) (referencing a 
Supreme Court statement that the purpose of bankruptcy law was to give the “honest but unfortunate 
debtor” a “fresh start”); CHARLES JORDAN TABB, LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 2 (4th ed. 2016) (stating 
that one goal of bankruptcy is to address claims for the same asset between more than one creditor). 
 2 Bankruptcy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); TABB, supra note 1. Upon the 
filing of bankruptcy, this person (or municipality) becomes a debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(13) 
(2012) (defining debtor as the person or municipality who is the subject of a bankruptcy case). A 
person, for the purposes of bankruptcy, includes an individual, a partnership, and a corporation. Id. 
§ 101(41). A creditor is an “entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or 
before the order for relief concerning the debtor.” Id. § 101(10)(A). An entity includes a person, 
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untarily against the debtor, and when filed, the court helps these consumers 
repay their debts to their creditors under the organization and protection of 
the bankruptcy system.3 There are two types of bankruptcy cases: liquida-
tion and reorganization.4 In liquidation cases, the court will order a bank-
ruptcy trustee to sell the debtor’s assets to pay off the debts owed to credi-
tors.5 In reorganization cases, the court may allow the debtor to keep certain 
assets in order to develop and implement a plan to repay debts using future 
earnings of those assets.6 
Under the Bankruptcy Code, the filing of a bankruptcy petition creates 
an estate containing all of the debtor’s assets, so that the bankruptcy trustee 
(or the debtor in possession) can manage those assets.7 The turnover provi-
sion of the Bankruptcy Code helps create this estate by requiring that any-
one “in possession, custody, or control, during the case, of property that the 
                                                                                                                           
among other things. Id. § 101(15). A claim is defined as a right to payment or “right to an equita-
ble remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment.” Id. 
§ 101(5). In voluntary cases, the order for relief is the date the petition is filed. Id. § 301. In invol-
untary cases, the court enters the order for relief, which will occur after the petition is filed. See id. 
§ 303(c) (stating that a creditor can join the bankruptcy case after the petition is filed but before 
the court enters the order for relief). 
 3 Edward H. Tillinghast, III, U.S. Bankruptcy Basics, SHEPPARD, MULLIN, RICHTER & HAMP-
TON LLP (2018), https://www.iiiglobal.org/sites/default/files/066_US_Bankruptcy_Basics_Ed_
Tillinghast.pdf [https://perma.cc/7HSQ-DBPH]; Bankruptcy, FINDLAW LEGAL DICTIONARY (online 
ed. 2018), http://dictionary.findlaw.com/definition/bankruptcy.html [https://perma.cc/L9RA-EERB]. 
 4 TABB, supra note 1, at 3, 6. The Bankruptcy Code provides six different types of relief: 
Liquidation (Chapter 7), Adjustment of Debts of a Municipality (Chapter 9), Reorganization 
(Chapter 11), Adjustment of Debts of a Family Farmer or Fisherman with Regular Annual Income 
(Chapter 12), Adjustment of Debts of an Individual with Regular Income (Chapter 13), and Ancil-
lary and Other Cross-Border Cases (Chapter 15). BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 1, at 6–8; 
Tillinghast, supra note 3. Chapter 7 is a liquidation chapter, while Chapters 9, 11, 12, and 13 are 
reorganization chapters. See generally BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 1 (explaining the differ-
ence between the different bankruptcy chapters). Chapter 15 deals with bankruptcy cases in other 
countries. Id. at 8. 
 5 BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 1, at 6. The bankruptcy trustee is a representative of the 
debtor’s bankruptcy estate and is in charge of the estate during the bankruptcy proceeding. Id. at 
76. In a reorganization case, the debtor acts as the bankruptcy trustee and is called the debtor in 
possession. See 11 U.S.C. § 1306(b) (stating that with a “confirmed plan or order confirming a 
plan, the debtor shall remain in possession of all property of the estate”). 
 6 BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 1, at 7; TABB, supra note 1, at 6. Reorganization is some-
times preferred by both debtors and creditors because the debtor is allowed to keep certain assets 
that are valuable to them, and the creditors, assuming a minimal risk of default, may potentially 
receive payments valued higher than those they would receive from a Chapter 7 filing. BANK-
RUPTCY BASICS, supra note 1, at 7; TABB, supra note 1, at 6. 
 7 11 U.S.C. § 541; Tillinghast, supra note 3. The estate consists of “all legal or equitable 
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.” 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). 
Who holds the property or where the property is held at the time of the filing is irrelevant for the 
purposes of creating the bankruptcy estate. Id.; BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 1, at 71. The 
Bankruptcy Code allows for both federal and state “exemption laws,” which protect certain prop-
erty of the debtor from creditor claims. 11 U.S.C. § 522; BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 1, at 
16, 73. This property is not included in the bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1). 
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trustee may use, sell, or lease under section 363 of this title . . . shall deliver 
to the trustee, and account for, such property or the value of such property 
. . . .” 8 
Upon filing for bankruptcy, one immediate debtor protection that arises 
is the “automatic stay” under 11 U.S.C. § 362.9 This provision protects the 
debtor and/or the debtor’s property against most collection or proceeding 
actions by creditors.10 This Comment analyzes the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit’s 2017 decision in In re Cowen, which addressed the 
issue of whether a creditor’s refusal to turn over the debtor’s property vio-
lated the automatic stay, when the creditor re-possessed the property before 
the debtor filed their petition for bankruptcy.11 
I. THE AUTOMATIC STAY PROVISION OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE IN MORE 
DETAIL AND THE FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF IN RE COWEN 
The specific issue regarding the automatic stay provision and what 
constitutes a violation of the stay has created disagreements between the 
                                                                                                                           
 8 11 U.S.C. § 542; see H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 367 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6322–6323 (stating that the scope of the provision that creates the bankruptcy 
estate is broad and property that is recovered under the turnover provision, § 542, is part of the 
estate). There are three situations in which turnover to the bankruptcy trustee is not required: 1) if 
the property is of insignificant value to the estate; 2) if whoever was in possession of the property 
rightfully transferred title before becoming aware of the bankruptcy filing; or 3) if “transfer of the 
property is automatic to pay a life insurance premium.” See Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 206 n.12 
(enumerating the three exceptions where the Bankruptcy Code does not require turn over based on 
11 U.S.C. § 542(a), (c), and (d)). 
 9 11 U.S.C. § 362; see H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 174 (stating that the automatic stay is one of 
the general provisions that applies and comes into effect as soon as bankruptcy is filed, regardless 
of the type of bankruptcy case). 
 10 BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 1, at 24, 71. The automatic stay provision provides the 
eight categories of actions that are prohibited by the stay: 1) “the commencement or continuation 
. . . [of any] action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced be-
fore the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that 
arose before the commencement of the case . . .”; 2) “the enforcement, against the debtor or 
against property of the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case . . .”; 
3) “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exer-
cise control over property of the estate”; 4) “any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against 
property of the estate”; 5) “any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any 
lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement of the case 
under this title”; 6) “any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose 
before the commencement of the case . . .”; 7) “the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that 
arose before the commencement of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor;” and 
8) “the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United States Tax Court concern-
ing a tax liability of a debtor . . . for a taxable period . . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1)–(8). A “willful 
violation” of the stay could make the creditor liable for damages to the debtor. Id. § 362(k)(1). 
 11 See infra notes 12–90 and accompanying text; see also WD Equip., LLC v. Cowen (In re 
Cowen), 849 F.3d 943, 946–951 (10th Cir. 2017) (reviewing the bankruptcy court’s decision that 
failing to return an asset that was taken pre-petition was a violation of the automatic stay). 
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courts, leaving the Tenth Circuit’s In re Cowen decision in the minority.12 
Section A of this Part explains the history of the Bankruptcy Code’s auto-
matic stay provision and its practical applications to debtors and creditors.13 
Section A looks specifically at § 362(a)(3), which prohibits “any act to ob-
tain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to 
exercise control over property of the estate” by the creditor.14 Section B of 
this Part provides and analyzes the facts, procedural history, and opinion of 
the Tenth Circuit’s In re Cowen decision.15 
A. Explanation and History of the Automatic Stay Provision,  
Specifically § 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code 
The automatic stay is essentially an injunction that arises as soon as 
bankruptcy is filed and goes into effect immediately, without any notice to 
the creditors.16 It prevents formal and informal actions and proceedings re-
garding collection of assets or recovery of claims by the creditor against the 
debtor, property of the estate, or property of the debtor as defined in 
§ 362(a).17 If the creditor seizes property that the trustee can use, sell, or 
lease from the debtor’s bankruptcy estate after the debtor has filed for bank-
ruptcy, § 542(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, the turnover provision, demands 
that the creditor relinquish the asset to the bankruptcy trustee.18 The auto-
matic stay, however, can be lifted, modified, or conditioned by the court 
                                                                                                                           
 12 See In re Cowen, 849 F.3d at 948, 950 (ruling in favor of the defendants and concluding 
that only “affirmative acts” to possess or control are violations of the stay, and therefore, passively 
holding onto a debtor’s assets that were acquired pre-petition and refusing to turn them over once 
bankruptcy has been filed is not a violation of the automatic stay). But see In re Weber, 719 F.3d 
at 79, 83 (concluding that the creditor refusing to return the pre-petition possessed vehicle belong-
ing to the debtor’s estate constituted “exercising control” over it and withholding the vehicle vio-
lated the automatic stay); Thompson, 566 F.3d at 703 (holding that merely possessing an asset is 
“exercising control” over it, which violates of the automatic stay); Cal. Emp’t Dev. Dep’t v. Taxel 
(In re Del Mission Ltd.), 98 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding that by retaining taxes, 
the State violated the automatic stay by exercising control over the funds after the debtor filed for 
bankruptcy); Knaus v. Concordia Lumber Co. (In re Knaus), 889 F.2d 773, 775 (8th Cir. 1989) 
(ruling that failing to turn over property, whether repossessed pre-petition or post-petition, is a 
violation of the automatic stay). 
 13 See infra notes 16–23 and accompanying text. 
 14 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (2012); see infra notes 16–23 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 24–45 and accompanying text. 
 16 See BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 1, at 71 (defining the automatic stay); TABB, supra 
note 1, at 237 (discussing that the automatic stay is effective immediately and that it is effective 
without notice to the relevant parties). 
 17 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (defining the automatic stay); H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340 (stating 
that the automatic stay prevents the creditor from initiating a collection or otherwise harassing the 
debtor); BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 1, at 24 (pointing out that even making phone calls 
demanding payments, although informal, constitutes a violation of the automatic stay provision). 
 18 11 U.S.C. § 542(a). If the asset is of inconsequential value or benefit to the estate, the turn-
over provision does not require the creditor to relinquish the asset. Id. 
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under certain circumstances.19 The scope of the automatic stay is intended 
to be broad, despite some necessary limitations and exceptions, in order to 
further its purpose of protecting both creditors and debtors and, in turn, to 
further the goals of bankruptcy as a whole.20 
In determining what constitutes a violation of the automatic stay under 
§ 362(a)(3), courts have relied on interpreting the plain language of the provi-
sion.21 Prior to 1984, this provision only prohibited acts to obtain possession 
of property belonging to the bankruptcy estate.22 Since the passage of the 
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, § 362(a)(3) 
now prohibits “any act to obtain possession or property of the estate or of 
property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate.”23 
                                                                                                                           
 19 Id. § 362(d). In order for the stay to be lifted or modified, the creditor must request the 
court to consider such termination or modification. Id. The stay can also be terminated or modified 
under two additional circumstances: 1) when the property in question is no longer part of the es-
tate, or 2) when the bankruptcy case is closed or discharge is granted. Id. § 362(c)(1)–(2); PRAC-
TICAL LAW, AUTOMATIC STAY: OVERVIEW (2018), Westlaw Practice Note 9-380-7953. 
 20 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340 (stating that the automatic stay is a fundamental protec-
tion for both debtors and creditors and therefore has a broad scope and application). The limita-
tions associated with the automatic stay are judicial and statutory. See AUTOMATIC STAY: OVER-
VIEW, supra note 19 (discussing the limitations of the automatic stay); supra note 19 and accom-
panying text. Section 362(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides the exceptions to the automatic 
stay, which include: “Criminal Proceedings”; “Post-Petition Lawsuits”; “Discovery from the 
Debtor”; “Alimony, Maintenance or Support Actions”; “Perfection of Certain Interests in Proper-
ty”; “Actions to Enforce Police and Regulatory Powers”; “Setoffs in Securities-Related Transac-
tions”; “HUD Foreclosures”; “Tax Audits, Notices and Demands”; “Actions for Possession of 
Expired Leases”; “Presentment of Negotiable Instruments”; “Foreclosures Under Merchant Ma-
rine Act”; “Actions to Enforce Higher Education Act”; “Liens for Ad Valorem Property Taxes”; 
“Loans from a Pension”; “Actions Against an Ineligible Debtor”; “Nonavoidable Transfers”; 
“Setoff of Income Tax Refund”; and “Medicare Exclusion[.]” 11 U.S.C. § 362(b); Understanding 
The Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy, LAW360 (June 25, 2014), https://www.law360.com/articles/
551844/understanding-the-automatic-stay-in-bankruptcy [https://perma.cc/SR58-ZGTT]. Another 
limitation to the stay is that it is not permanent. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. Moreo-
ver, the stay prevents recovery on claims that arose before the commencement of the case. 11 
U.S.C. § 362(a)(1); see AUTOMATIC STAY: OVERVIEW, supra note 19 (explaining that the auto-
matic stay does not apply to claims that arise post-petition). It also prohibits the enforcement of 
judgments, but this only applies to ones that were obtained before the start of the case. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 362(a)(2); AUTOMATIC STAY: OVERVIEW, supra note 19.  
 21 See In re Cowen, 849 F.3d at 949 (interpreting § 362(a)(3) grammatically and defining the 
word “act,” so as to determine whether passively holding onto an asset that was repossessed pre-
petition is a violation of the automatic stay); In re Weber, 719 F.3d at 79 (consulting the dictionary 
for the definition of the word “control” in order to determine if the creditor’s refusal to return the 
debtor’s vehicle is a violation of the stay); Thompson, 566 F.3d at 702 (interpreting the phrase 
“exercise control” to determine if an asset possessed by the creditor pre-petition and the creditor’s 
refusal to turn over said asset is a violation of the automatic stay). 
 22 See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 
Stat. 333 (amending the language of § 362(a)(3) in the Bankruptcy Code). 
 23 Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). Since Congress did not provide any explanation or commentary 
as to why it added this language to the provision, it has been left to the courts to interpret its mean-
ing and application. In re Young, 193 B.R. 620, 623 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1996); see In re Weber, 719 
F.3d at 80 (concluding that the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 
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B. Factual and Procedural History of In re Cowen 
In 2013, Jared Trent Cowen borrowed money from WD Equipment, 
owned by Aaron Williams, to repair one of his commercial trucks.24 In ex-
change for the funds, Mr. Cowen gave WD Equipment a lien on the truck 
and promised Mr. Williams that he would pay off his loan.25 A few week 
after getting his truck repaired, Mr. Cowen’s truck broke down and was in 
need of about $9,000 in additional repairs, which Mr. Cowen did not have.26 
Because Mr. Cowen could not use his truck, his source of regular income, 
he could not meet his payment obligations to WD Equipment.27 Mr. Cowen 
attempted to refinance the loan and communicated his situation to Mr. Wil-
liams, who in return accelerated the payoff date to August 6th.28 While at-
tempting to repay WD Equipment, Mr. Cowen defaulted on a different loan 
that was owed to Bert Dring and secured by a second truck.29 On July 29th, 
Mr. Dring repossessed the truck using intimidation and false pretenses.30 Mr. 
                                                                                                                           
broadened the automatic stay provision, which is consistent with Congress’ intent to further the 
goals of debtor protection by preventing creditors from holding onto assets, regardless of when 
they acquired possession of the assets); Thompson, 566 F.3d at 702 (explaining that the amend-
ment to the automatic stay provision is proof of Congress’s intent to expand potential violations of 
the stay so as to include more than mere possession of an asset). 
 24 In re Cowen, 849 F.3d at 945. Mr. Cowen owned a trucking company, J & S Trucking, as a 
sole proprietorship, which he ran by operating two semi-trucks: a Peterbilt and a Kenworth. Ap-
pellant’s Opening Brief at 5, In re Cowen, 849 F.3d 943 (No. 15-1413); Appellee’s Opening Brief 
at 2, In re Cowen, 849 F.3d 943 (No. 15-1413). Mr. Cowen borrowed money from Mr. Williams 
in order to repair the Peterbilt. In re Cowen, 849 F.3d at 945. 
 25 In re Cowen, 849 F.3d at 945. A lien, as defined in the Bankruptcy Code, is an “interest in 
property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(37). 
 26 In re Cowen, 849 F.3d at 945. 
 27 See id. at 945–46 (explaining that without his trucks, Mr. Cowen had no consistent in-
come). 
 28 Id. at 945. In attempting to refinance, Mr. Cowen had meetings with his bank and his fami-
ly members. Id. “Refinancing” refers to finding other sources of funding, such as taking out larger 
loans to pay off old loans or negotiating a lower interest rate. Refinancing, BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY (10th ed. 2014). The communications between Mr. Cowen and Mr. Williams occurred 
over text between August 1st and August 2nd. In re Cowen, 849 F.3d at 945. During these interac-
tions, Mr. Williams changed and moved the date forward by which Mr. Cowen had to repay Mr. 
Williams before setting it for August 6th. Id. Because Mr. Williams was able to accelerate the loan 
payments, the loan agreement must have had an acceleration clause, which states that upon de-
fault, the creditor can accelerate the remaining future payments to a present due date. Acceleration 
Clause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see In re Cowen, 849 F.3d at 945 (stating 
that Mr. Williams accelerated the payoff date). Additionally, in these text exchanges, Mr. Wil-
liams was inconsistent regarding the amount that Mr. Cowen would need to pay to settle the debt. 
In re Cowen, 849 F.3d at 945.  
 29 In re Cowen, 849 F.3d at 945. Mr. Dring, Mr. Williams’s father-in-law, had a “purchase 
money security interest” in the second truck, the Kenworth. Id. A purchase money security interest 
is effectuated when a lender extends credit to a buyer in order to purchase something specific, 
with the lender retaining a security interest in that property. See U.C.C. § 9-103(b) (2010). 
 30 In re Cowen, 849 F.3d at 945. Mr. Dring tricked Mr. Cowen into going to Mr. Dring’s 
place of business with the truck by asking him to drop off a trailer. Id.; Appellee’s Opening Brief, 
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Cowen received a letter a few days after the encounter, which stated that he 
had ten days to pay off the debt owed to Mr. Dring on the second truck.31 
On August 6th, after having both trucks repossessed, Mr. Cowen filed 
for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.32 Mr. Cowen made 
both Mr. Williams and Mr. Dring aware that he had filed for bankruptcy and 
requested the return of his trucks immediately.33 Both defendants refused to 
return the trucks, claiming that title had been transferred or that they had 
already sold the trucks prior to Mr. Cowen filing for bankruptcy.34 
One month later, Mr. Cowen filed a motion asking the bankruptcy 
court to provide orders showing why the defendants have not been held in 
violation of the automatic stay.35 In granting Mr. Cowen’s motion, the bank-
ruptcy court ordered the immediate turnover of the trucks.36 Neither de-
fendant complied, and Mr. Cowen subsequently filed an adversary proceed-
ing for violations of the automatic stay.37 The bankruptcy court ruled in favor 
                                                                                                                           
supra note 24, at 2. When Mr. Cowen arrived with his son, Mr. Dring told him to leave the keys in 
the ignition and exit the vehicle. In re Cowen, 849 F.3d at 945. Mr. Cowen did as he was told, and 
Mr. Dring entered the truck and declared the truck “repossessed.” Id. Mr. Dring and five other 
men intimidated and threatened Mr. Cowen and his son with a can of mace until they left the 
property on foot. Id. This series of events was disputed by both Mr. Dring and the men that were 
with him; however, the bankruptcy court gave more weight to Mr. Cowen’s testimony. Appellee’s 
Opening Brief, supra note 24, at 2; see In re Cowen, 849 F.3d at 946 (stating that the bankruptcy 
court didn’t believe defendants’ testimony). 
 31 In re Cowen, 849 F.3d at 945. 
 32 Id. at 946. The opinion is silent as to when and how Mr. Williams repossessed the truck he 
had a lien on. See id. at 945–46. Mr. Cowen filed for bankruptcy on the deadline for paying off the 
first truck to Mr. Williams, and before the ten-day cure period ended for the second truck. Id. 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy, also called a wage earner’s plan, provides relief for individual consumers 
with a regular income. BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 1, at 22. Having a regular income is a 
requirement for relief under Chapter 13. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (2012). Filing Chapter 13 allows the 
debtor to reorganize, come up with a plan to pay off debts, and discharges remaining debt. See 
Shu-Yi Oei, Taxing Bankrupts, 55 B.C. L. REV. 375, 389 (2014) (explaining the power of the 
Chapter 13 discharge).  
 33 In re Cowen, 849 F.3d at 946. 
 34 Id. Mr. Williams argued that he transferred the title of the truck to himself prior to Mr. 
Cowen filing for bankruptcy. Id. There is no evidence, however, that Mr. Williams made Mr. 
Cowen aware of a title change regarding the truck in the text exchange between the two. Id. Mr. 
Dring claimed that he sold the second truck before Mr. Cowen filed for bankruptcy. Id. At first, he 
claimed that he sold it in an undocumented sale prior to Mr. Cowen’s filing; however, he later 
produced a bill of sale, which showed that he sold the truck for cash on August 4th. Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. The defendants were warned that they could be liable for damages if they did not turn 
over the trucks, which could be found to be a willful violation of the automatic stay. Id. 
 37 Id. A debtor can file an adversary proceeding, which is a separate lawsuit brought by the 
debtor in order to recover money or property for the bankruptcy estate. BANKRUPTCY BASICS, 
supra note 1, at 37. Because Mr. Cowen was not producing a regular income stream, he was no 
longer eligible for relief under Chapter 13. In re Cowen, 849 F.3d at 946; see 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) 
(2012) (stating an individual’s requirements to be eligible for Chapter 13 relief). Consequently, 
the bankruptcy court dismissed Mr. Cowen’s bankruptcy case. In re Cowen, 849 F.3d at 946. The 
court continued with the adversary proceeding. Id. During the adversary proceeding, the defend-
544 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:E. Supp. 
of Mr. Cowen, finding that the defendants produced counterfeit paperwork 
regarding the sales of the trucks and that their testimony regarding the trans-
fer of title of the trucks was not credible.38 The court concluded that the de-
fendants violated § 362(a)(3) of the automatic stay provision and subsequent-
ly awarded both actual and punitive damages to Mr. Cowen.39 
Defendants appealed, first to the district court and then to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.40 The defendants argued that 
the bankruptcy court did not have jurisdiction over the adversary proceed-
ing, and that the bankruptcy court incorrectly interpreted the automatic stay 
provision, § 362(a)(3).41 Regarding the interpretation of the automatic stay, 
the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision, finding that de-
fendants’ refusal to return the trucks after Mr. Cowen filed for bankruptcy 
violated § 362(a)(3).42 On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the court reviewed 
the bankruptcy court’s legal conclusions de novo and the factual findings 
for error.43 The Tenth Circuit concluded that the bankruptcy court incorrect-
ly interpreted § 362(a)(3) and that passive retention of an asset of the bank-
ruptcy estate was not a violation of the automatic stay.44 Consequently, the 
                                                                                                                           
ants argued they did not violate the automatic stay because Mr. Cowen no longer had any rights to 
the trucks, since they correctly terminated his rights before the start of the bankruptcy case. Id. 
 38 In re Cowen, 849 F.3d at 946. The court found that the defendants likely forged the sale 
documents. Id. It also concluded that the defendants gave perjured testimony and told their wit-
nesses what to say on the stand in order to convince the court that there was a proper transfer of 
rights before Mr. Cowen filed for bankruptcy. Id. The bankruptcy court also mentioned that even 
if there were a proper transfer of rights pre-petition, the actions they claimed to take were in viola-
tion of Colorado state law and therefore did not properly cut off Mr. Cowen’s ownership rights in 
the two trucks. Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id.; see Cowen v. WD Equip., LLC (In re Cowen), 549 B.R. 774, 789 (Bankr. D. Colo. 
2015) (In re Cowen District) (ruling on defendants’ first appeal).  
 41 In re Cowen, 849 F.3d at 946–47.  
 42 See In re Cowen District, 549 B.R. at 789 (holding that the bankruptcy court did not err in 
its interpretation application of § 362(a)(3) on these facts). Although the district court affirmed the 
bankruptcy court’s conclusion regarding the violation of the automatic stay, it reversed on the 
calculation of damages for such violation. Id. Regarding the jurisdictional issue, the district court 
held that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over the adversary proceeding even though the 
original bankruptcy case was dismissed. Id.  
 43 See In re Cowen, 849 F.3d at 947 (quoting FB Acquisition Prop. I, LLC v. Gentry (In re 
Gentry), 807 F.3d 1222, 1225 (10th Cir. 2015). The district court was treated as “‘a subordinate 
appellate tribunal whose rulings [were] not entitled to any deference . . . .’” See id. (quoting Nel-
son v. Long (In re Long), 843 F.3d 871, 873 (10th Cir. 2016)). 
 44 See id. at 948, 950 (holding that it does not agree with the bankruptcy court’s interpretation 
of the automatic stay and finding that “only affirmative acts to gain possession of, or to exercise 
control over, property of the estate violate § 362(a)(3)”). Regarding the issue of jurisdiction, the 
Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision that the bankruptcy court did have jurisdiction 
in the adversary proceeding. Id. at 948. Under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1), bankruptcy courts properly 
exercise jurisdiction whenever they “enter final judgments in ‘all core proceedings arising under 
Title 11, or arising in a case under Title 11.’” Id. at 947 (citing Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 
474 (2011). The Bankruptcy Code provides a non-exclusive list of matters that are considered core 
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Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling and remanded the case back 
to the district court.45  
II. MAJORITY VERSUS MINORITY VIEWS OF § 362(a)(3) OF THE  
AUTOMATIC STAY PROVISION 
Various courts have addressed the issue of whether refusing to turn over 
an asset of the estate, which a creditor acquired pre-petition, is a violation of 
the automatic stay provision.46 The majority of courts have concluded that 
refusal to turn over an asset of the estate acquired pre-petition is a violation.47 
The minority of courts, including the Tenth Circuit, have concluded that such 
refusal is not a violation and determined instead that only affirmative acts can 
constitute violations.48 Section A of this Part discusses the majority view’s 
interpretation of § 362(a)(3) of the automatic stay.49 Section B of this Part 
discusses the Tenth Circuit’s decision in WD Equipment v. Cowen (In re Cow-
en) and analyze the reasoning behind this minority view.50 
                                                                                                                           
matters. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) (2012). A claim for damages asserting a violation of the automatic 
stay is defined as a “core proceeding.” In re Cowen, 849 F.3d at 947 (citing Johnson v. Smith (In 
re Johnson), 575 F.3d 1079, 1083 (10th Cir. 2009)). 
 45 In re Cowen, 849 F.3d at 951. When an appellate court reverses a decision of a lower court, 
it is invalidated. Reverse, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Remanding a case means 
to send it back to the court that last ruled on it. Remand, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014). The Tenth Circuit gave the district court the authority to remand the case to the bankruptcy 
court. In re Cowen, 849 F.3d at 951. 
 46 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 47 See Weber v. SEFCU (In re Weber), 719 F.3d 72, 79, 83 (2d Cir. 2013) (concluding that 
the creditor refusing to return the pre-petition, repossessed vehicle belonging to the estate of the 
debtor was “exercising control” over it and that withholding the vehicle violated the automatic 
stay); Thompson v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 566 F.3d 699, 703 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding 
that merely possessing an asset is “exercising control” over it, which in turn violates of the auto-
matic stay); Cal. Emp’t Dev. Dep’t v. Taxel (In re Del Mission Ltd.), 98 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 
1996) (concluding that by retaining taxes, the State violated the automatic stay by exercising con-
trol over the debtor’s assets after the debtor filed for bankruptcy); Knaus v. Concordia Lumber Co. 
(In re Knaus), 889 F.2d 773, 775 (8th Cir. 1989) (ruling that failing to turn over property, whether 
that property had been repossessed pre-petition or post-petition, is a violation of the automatic 
stay). 
 48 See WD Equip., LLC v. Cowen (In re Cowen), 849 F.3d 943, 950 (10th Cir. 2017) (ruling 
in favor of the defendants and concluding that only “affirmative acts” to possess or control a debt-
or’s assets are violations of the stay, and therefore, passively holding onto a debtor’s assets, ac-
quired pre-petition, and refusing to turn them over once bankruptcy has been filed is not a viola-
tion of the automatic stay); In re Young, 193 B.R. 620, 629 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1996) (holding that a 
creditor’s retention of a debtor’s property did not constitute a violation of the automatic stay). 
 49 See infra notes 51–62 and accompanying text. 
 50 See supra note 48 and accompanying text; infra notes 63–73 and accompanying text. 
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A. Explanation of the Majority View 
Courts that have supported the majority view, which include the Sec-
ond, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, concluded that when a 
creditor refuses to turn over an asset of the estate that they acquired pre-
petition, that creditor was in violation of the automatic stay.51 These courts 
all began their argument with the 1983 case United States v. Whiting Pools, 
Inc., in which the U.S. Supreme Court addressed a similar issue involving a 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy.52 Whiting Pools addressed the issue of whether 
§ 542(a) of the turnover provision required the creditor to turn over property 
that was repossessed pre-petition.53 The Court ruled that debtor property, 
including property subject to a lien, that was not in the debtor’s possession 
at the time of petition was still subject to the turnover provision and part of 
bankruptcy estate.54 
                                                                                                                           
 51 See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 52 See In re Weber, 719 F.3d at 77 (using the Whiting Pools decision as the basis for deciding 
the issue of whether failing to turn over an asset of the estate immediately after filing of bankrupt-
cy is “exercising control” over the equitable interest in the asset, and therefore a violation of the 
automatic stay); Thompson, 566 F.3d at 700, 701 (beginning the court’s opinion by discussing the 
Whiting Pools discussion); In re Knaus, 889 F.2d at 775 (citing to Whiting Pools in determining 
what constitutes property of the estate); infra note 53 and accompanying text. See generally Unit-
ed States v. Whiting Pools Inc., 462 U.S. 198 (1983). In Whiting Pools, the debtor filed for bank-
ruptcy after the Internal Revenue Service took possession of the debtor’s property to satisfy a tax lien. 
Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 199. Chapter 11 bankruptcy generally provides relief for commercial 
enterprises. BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 1, at 7. The idea is to have the business repay its 
debts while still being able to run as a business, so this type of relief focuses on reorganization. Id. 
 53 Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 202. The turnover provision of the Bankruptcy Code requires 
the creditor to turn over certain property of the estate to the bankruptcy trustee that the trustee can 
use sell or lease under § 363, unless the property is of “inconsequential value or benefit to the 
estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (2012). The Supreme Court in Whiting Pools did not address whether 
its ruling could be extended to Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases; rather, the Court limited their deci-
sion to Chapter 11 cases. See generally Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 198 (focusing on Chapter 11 
cases). Throughout the case, the Court specified that this was a decision regarding a Chapter 11 
bankruptcy case and made no other commentary regarding the other chapters of the Bankruptcy 
Code. See generally id. Courts, however, have not limited the ruling in this case to Chapter 11 
cases, observing that all of the relevant statutes of the Bankruptcy Code apply to the “estate.” See 
Thompson, 566 F.3d at 705 (stating that the policy behind Chapter 11 and 13 is similar—
providing the debtor with an opportunity to repay his debts by reorganizing—and, therefore, the 
holding in Whiting Pools should apply to both Chapters); Unified People’s Fed. Credit Union v. 
Yates (In re Yates), 332 B.R. 1, 6–7 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2005) (acknowledging that even though 
Whiting Pools was limited to Chapter 11 cases, there is no explicit reason why the ruling should 
not also be applied to Chapter 13 cases). 
 54 See Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 207, 209 (concluding that § 542(a) gives the bankruptcy 
estate a possessory interest in property that was not in the possession of the debtor at the outset of 
the case and therefore was part of the bankruptcy estate). The Court examined both § 541(a), which 
defines the bankruptcy estate, and § 542(a), the turnover provision. Id. at 204–05. Regarding the 
bankruptcy estate provision, § 541(a)(1), the Court noted that the provision’s scope is wide and not 
limiting in any way, according to House and Senate Reports. Id. This provision is intended to include 
property that other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code allocate to the estate, regardless of whether the 
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Because the Whiting Pools decision effectively converts a debtor’s equi-
table interest into a possessory interest, superior to the interest of the creditor, 
the turnover provision is self-executing and possession of an asset belonging 
to the bankruptcy estate after bankruptcy has been filed could be a violation 
of the automatic stay.55 The view taken by the majority of courts emphasizes 
the relationship between § 542(a) and § 362(a)(3), and states that these two 
provisions work together to further the goals of bankruptcy.56 Together, these 
provisions accomplish this by grouping all of the debtor’s property together, 
protecting it from creditors, and allowing the debtor a “fresh start” via paying 
off their debts.57 
                                                                                                                           
debtor maintained physical possession of the asset at the time of filing. Id. at 205. The Court con-
cluded that § 542(a), although not without limitations, is one of the provisions that allows property 
that the debtor did not possess when the debtor filed for bankruptcy to be included as part of the 
estate. Id. at 205–06. In other words, there is no requirement or limitation that the debtor have a pos-
sessory interest in an asset at the time bankruptcy is filed in order to include it as part of the estate. Id. 
at 206. Accordingly, this turnover provision gives the estate a possessory interest in property, and 
therefore that property can be included as part of the estate. See id. at 207 (concluding that the estate 
has a possessory interest in such property). 
 55 See id. at 207 (concluding that § 542(a) grants a possessory interest to the debtor’s estate 
even if such asset was not held by the estate and was held by the secured creditor when the bank-
ruptcy petition was filed); In re Weber, 719 F.3d at 79 (citing 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 
§ 542.02 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2013)) (stating that the trustee does 
not have to do anything for the turnover provision to come into effect, making it self-executing). 
 56 See Thompson, 566 F.3d at 702 (pointing out that the primary goal of reorganization bank-
ruptcy is to allow the debtor use of all assets of the estate, including those that a creditor possessed 
before bankruptcy was filed, so that the debtor can pay off debts); Anne Zoltani & Janice Miller 
Karlin, Examining § 362(a)(3): When “Stay” Means Stay, AM. BANKR. INST. J., May 1, 2017, at 
20, 21 (discussing the majority view on the automatic stay issue and the relationship that the 
courts make between the automatic stay provision and the turnover provision). This interpretation 
supports the idea that § 362 provides relief when the turnover provision is not complied with un-
der § 542. Zoltani & Karlin, supra, at 21; see Abrams v. Sw. Leasing & Rental Inc. (In re 
Abrams), 127 B.R. 239, 243 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996) (stating that support for the idea that § 542 
provides the right and § 362 provides the remedy is found in the fact that the Bankruptcy Code 
does not have any remedy or violation provisions under § 542, whereas § 362 does). 
 57 See Thompson, 566 F.3d at 702 (making the additional policy argument that an asset will 
be both beneficial to the debtor and the creditor when it is part of the bankruptcy estate); Zoltani & 
Karlin, supra note 56, at 20–21 (discussing how these provisions, in unison, enable the goals of 
bankruptcy to be achieved). The goals of the bankruptcy system are to resolve priority issues be-
tween competing creditors who have claims on the same assets and to relieve the debtor of these 
claims and give them a “fresh start.” See In re Weber, 719 F.3d at 76 (discussing the automatic 
stay and turnover provisions and how they enforce the goals of bankruptcy, which include relief to 
the debtor and allowing them a “fresh start”); Thompson, 566 F.3d at 706 (stating that the purpose 
of both corporate and personal reorganization seek to assist the debtor in “regain[ing] his financial 
foothold” in order to pay off his debts to his creditors); see also Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 203 
(stating that the goal of reorganization is to allow businesses to continue running in order to pay 
off debts to creditors); BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 1, at 6 (citing Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 
292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)) (referencing a Supreme Court statement that the purpose of bankruptcy 
law was to give the “honest but unfortunate debtor” a “fresh start”); TABB, supra note 1, at 2 (stat-
ing that another goal of bankruptcy is to address claims for the same asset between creditors). 
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The various courts that have deemed a failure to turn over an asset ac-
quired pre-petition to be a violation of the automatic stay continued their 
discussion by interpreting the plain meaning of the provision.58 These 
courts looked at the plain meaning of the phrase “exercise control” and con-
cluded that passively holding onto an asset while depriving the debtor of the 
beneficial use of that asset fell under the definition of “exercising control,” 
which in turn was a violation of the automatic stay provision.59 
Moreover, the majority approach, which is highly dependent on policy 
considerations, views the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship 
Act of 1984 as broadening the reach of the automatic stay provision to in-
clude more than just merely “obtaining possession.”60 The courts acknowl-
edged the lack of explanation for the amendments by Congress; however, 
they reasoned that the expansion intrinsically illustrated that Congress in-
tended the automatic stay to apply to assets that were acquired before the 
petition for bankruptcy was filed.61 The expansion of the provision is con-
sistent with the Supreme Court’s explicit understanding that the overarching 
goal of bankruptcy is to allow the debtor to get back in a position where 
they can satisfy all of their debts.62 
                                                                                                                           
 58 See In re Weber, 719 F.3d at 79 (consulting the dictionary for definition of “control” in 
order to determine if the creditor’s refusal to return the debtor’s vehicle is a violation of the stay); 
Thompson, 566 F.3d at 702 (interpreting the phrase “exercise control” in order to determine if an 
asset possessed by the creditor pre-petition coupled with the same creditor’s refusal to turn over 
the asset is a violation of the automatic stay). 
 59 See In re Weber, 719 F.3d at 79 (citing WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 
(4th ed. 2002) (relying on the dictionary definition of “control,” which means “‘to exercise author-
ity over[,] direct[,] or command,’” and concluding that by refusing to return the vehicle to the 
debtor, the creditor was “exercising control” over an asset in which the debtor had an equitable 
interest and that retaining such asset was a violation of the stay); Thompson, 566 F.3d at 702 (us-
ing the dictionary definition of the word “control” in concluding that holding on to an asset and 
prohibiting the debtor from using that asset for their benefit was a violation of the automatic stay 
provision). 
 60 See In re Weber, 719 F.3d at 80 (concluding that the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal 
Judgeship Act of 1984 broadened the automatic stay provision, which is consistent with Con-
gress’s intent to further the goals of debtor protection by preventing creditors from holding onto 
an asset, regardless of when they acquired possession of the asset); Thompson, 566 F.3d at 702 
(explaining that the amendment to the automatic stay is proof of Congress’s intent to expand vio-
lations of the stay to include more than just those merely possessing the asset); see also supra 
notes 22–23 and accompanying text. 
 61 See In re Weber, 719 F.3d at 80 (agreeing that Congress intended to include repossession of 
assets by creditors and the refusal to return such assets to be considered violations of the automatic 
stay); Thompson, 566 F.3d at 702 (explaining that the expansion suggests Congress intended to 
include the act of repossessing an asset pre-petition as a violation of the automatic stay); Javens v. 
City of Hazel Park (In re Javens), 107 F.3d 359, 368 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating that the amendment 
to the automatic stay provision could be perceived as evidence that Congress intended for the 
provision to be applied to property that was not in the possession of the debtor when bankruptcy 
was filed). 
 62 See Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 203 (stating that the goal of reorganization is to allow the 
debtor to continue producing income, in order to pay off their debts); Thompson, 566 F.3d at 703 
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B. Explanation of the Minority View, as in In re Cowen 
In In re Cowen, the Tenth Circuit concluded that it was not a violation of 
the automatic stay when the creditors refused to turn over the commercial 
trucks they had each repossessed prior to the debtor’s filing of bankruptcy.63 
The court began its analysis by pointing out that the majority view is too reli-
ant on “practical considerations” and policy, as opposed to following the 
plain words of the automatic stay provision.64 Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit 
started its language analysis by focusing on and defining the phrase “any 
act.”65 It reasoned that “any act” applies to both “obtain[ing] possession” 
“exercise[ing] control” and defined “act” to mean “take action” or “do some-
thing.”66 The Tenth Circuit’s analysis led it to conclude that the automatic 
stay provision only prohibits creditors from actively “doing something to ob-
tain possession of or to exercise control over the estate’s property.”67 
                                                                                                                           
(quoting TranSouth Fin. Corp. v. Sharon (In re Sharon), 234 B.R. 676, 682 (B.A.P. 6th Cir.1999)) 
(stating that refusal to return an asset to the bankruptcy estate constitutes “exercising control” 
because it does not allow the debtor to use that asset to his benefit and in turn, to the benefit of the 
creditor); In re Del Mission, 98 F.3d at 1151 (pointing out that the purpose of the automatic stay is 
to relieve debtors from claims or proceedings against them during bankruptcy); In re Knaus, 889 
F.2d at 774, 775 (acknowledging that the purpose of the automatic stay, specifically in a Chapter 
11 case, is to allow the debtor to use their assets to produce income so that they can eventually 
repay their debts, and when the creditor refuses to turn over assets, they are preventing the debtor 
from continuing his business). There is an additional policy argument that states that the case law 
and legislative history relating to the automatic stay provision shows that Congress did not intend 
to “place the burden on the bankruptcy estate to absorb the expense of potentially multiple turno-
ver actions, at least not without providing a means to recover damages sustained as a consequence 
thereof.” In re Del Mission, 98 F.3d at 1151–52 (quoting In re Abrams, 127 B.R. at 243). 
 63 See In re Cowen, 849 F.3d at 950 (holding that only affirmative acts to “obtain possession” 
and “exercise control” are violations of the automatic stay). 
 64 Id. at 948–49. In re Cowen cites to In re Weber and Thompson, which each rely heavily on 
legislative history and policy considerations to interpret the automatic stay provision. Id.; see 
Weber, 719 F.3d at 81 (relying on the policy behind reorganization and what it seeks to achieve); 
Thompson, 566 F.3d at 703 (stating that Whiting Pools and policy considerations support the ma-
jority view of the interpretation of the automatic say); see also supra notes 60–62 and accompany-
ing text. The Tenth Circuit puts more weight on the plain language of the statute, stating that if the 
plain language interpretation answers the question, the analysis need not go any further. In re 
Cowen, 849 F.3d at 949. 
 65 In re Cowen, 849 F.3d at 949. 
 66 Id. The court stated that “any act” was a prepositive modifier to both the phrases “to obtain 
possession” and “to exercise control.” Id. 
 67 Id. Because the Tenth Circuit reasoned that the creditor has to actively do something, it 
concluded that the automatic stay provision does not cover a situation where the creditor merely 
holds on to an asset. Id. The court also stated that “stay means stay, not go[,]” meaning that this 
provision does not make the creditor liable to turn over the property. Id. In addressing the same 
issue regarding the automatic stay, the United States Bankruptcy Court of the District of Columbia 
attacked the majority view’s conclusion by criticizing its interpretation of the phrase “exercise 
control.” See In re Young, 193 B.R. at 624 (stating that the phrase is ambiguous and that without 
any legislative history, we cannot truly understand what Congress intended). In order to attempt to 
understand what the phrase means, the court looked at the wording of the turnover provision, 
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The Tenth Circuit determined that courts which support the majority 
view have relied too heavily on the legislative history of § 362(a)(3) and 
incorrectly assumed that Congress intended to prohibit creditors from hold-
ing on to property that belongs to the debtor or the bankruptcy estate.68 The 
court instead took the position that, by using the word “control,” Congress 
intended to reach conduct in which the creditor did not have possession of 
the asset but would still interfere with the estate’s property interest.69 Addi-
tionally, the court concluded that the automatic stay provision does not im-
pose an affirmative obligation to turn over property because there is no leg-
islative history to support that assertion and Congress would have explicitly 
done so had that been the intention.70 
The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that the majority’s best argument was 
that the automatic stay and the turnover provision should be read together; 
however, the court concluded that this analysis too was unsupported.71 The 
Tenth Circuit noted that bankruptcy courts do not need the automatic stay 
provision to enforce the turnover provision, because these courts have been 
granted “broad equitable powers” by law and can enforce the turnover pro-
vision independently, when appropriate.72 The Tenth Circuit concluded, af-
ter consideration of the reasons discussed above, that only affirmative acts 
of possession or control are violations of the automatic stay provision.73 
                                                                                                                           
which uses the phrase “possession, custody, or control.” Id. The court therefore concluded that 
because every word Congress used was significant, the definition of “control” must not include 
the definition of “custody.” Id. 
 68See In re Cowen, 849 F.3d at 949 (criticizing the majority view’s assumption that Congress 
intended to prohibit creditors from possessing debtor property). The Tenth Circuit posited that the 
majority view came to this assumption based on the sole fact that Congress amended the automat-
ic stay provision to prohibit more than merely obtaining possession. Id. 
 69 Id. at 949–50 (quoting Ralph Brubaker, Turnover, Adequate Protection, and the Automatic 
Stay (Part II): Who Is “Exercising Control” Over What?, 33 BANKR. L. LETTER, Sept. 2013, at 1, 
1–11). An example of an act that “exercises control” but does not “obtain possession” of the prop-
erty would be when a creditor who possesses a debtor’s property improperly sells the asset. Id. 
 70 Id. at 950. 
 71 Id. Courts that support the majority view have held that the turnover provision was uncon-
ditionally self-executing and together, these provisions furthered the goals of bankruptcy to group 
all of the debtor’s assets together for the purposes of financial relief and repayment of debt to 
creditors. Id. The Tenth Circuit stated that this majority view was unsupported because there is no 
“textual link” between the two provisions, nor is there any legislative history to support the con-
clusion. Id. 
 72 Id. (citing Scrivner v. Mashburn (In re Scrivner), 535 F.3d 1258, 1263 (10th Cir. 2008)). 
Bankruptcy courts have been granted these “‘broad equitable powers’” under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), 
and can enforce the turnover provision to provide relief as “‘necessary or appropriate to carry out 
the provisions of’ § 542(a).” Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012)). 
 73 Id.; see supra notes 63–72 and accompanying text. There is an additional argument of “ad-
equate protection,” which states that secured creditors do not have to turn over assets immediately 
upon the filing of bankruptcy unless and until they are given adequate protection. See Thompson, 
566 F.3d at 703 (citing Nash v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re Nash), 228 B.R. 669 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
1999)) (stating that several district courts in multiple jurisdictions have ruled that a creditor does 
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III. THE TENTH CIRCUIT INCORRECTLY DECIDED IN RE COWEN 
The Tenth Circuit incorrectly decided WD Equipment v. Cowen (In re 
Cowen) by concluding that a violation of the automatic stay is only limited 
to affirmative acts to possess or control an asset.74 The law of bankruptcy 
has two overarching goals: to provide equal treatment to creditors in terms 
of repaying the debt and to provide the debtor a “fresh start.”75 Enforcement 
of the automatic stay enhances these overall bankruptcy goals and is a bene-
fit to both debtors and creditors.76 For debtors, the automatic stay prevents 
all collection efforts and actions by creditors, giving the debtor financial 
relief and the ability to collect their assets into an estate, in order to repay 
the debts or create a reorganization plan.77 Additionally, when the automatic 
stay is in effect, it allows for multiple creditor claims to be handled in an 
organized and equitable fashion by the court.78 Ruling that the defendants in 
In re Cowen were not in violation of the stay by refusing to turn over the 
trucks, the Tenth Circuit effectively undermined important policy considera-
tions surrounding bankruptcy and the automatic stay.79 Mr. Cowen was not 
able to receive the financial relief that the stay was intended to provide due 
to the court’s holding, which removed his main source of income in the 
form of his trucks, and therefore Mr. Cowen could not attempt to repay or 
reorganize, to the potential detriment of other possible creditors.80 
                                                                                                                           
not need to turn over the asset if they receive no adequate protection); Spears v. Ford Motor Credit 
Co. (In re Spears), 223 B.R. 159 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998); In re Young, 193 B.R. at 625 (reasoning 
that a creditor does not have to turn over an asset to a debtor or bankruptcy estate until they re-
ceive adequate protection from the court); see also 11 U.S.C. § 361 (establishing adequate protec-
tion). The purpose of this requirement of assured “adequate protection” is to provide protection for 
the creditor in situations where the value of the asset that they maintain an interest in decreases 
due to it being used by the debtor or due to the automatic stay provision. MARY K. DENEVI, EVAD-
ING THE AUTOMATIC STAY IN BANKRUPTCY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO OBTAINING RELIEF FROM 
THE AUTOMATIC STAY IN BANKRUPTCY COURT 43 (1991). 
 74 See infra notes 75–90 and accompanying text. 
 75 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 76 See infra notes 77–78 and accompanying text. 
 77 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6297–98; 
see also Knaus v. Concordia Lumber Co. (In re Knaus), 889 F.2d 773, 775 (8th Cir. 1989) (stating 
that the purpose of the automatic stay is to provide some financial relief for the debtor). When the 
debtor is in possession of the asset, they can put it to beneficial use in order to come up with the 
funds to repay their debts. See In re Knaus, 889 F.2d at 775 (stating that when the creditor has 
possession of the asset, the debtor cannot put that asset to use to continue business). 
 78 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340 (stating that without the stay, the first creditor to seek 
self-help against the debtor will be given full or at least some advantage over subsequent credi-
tors). 
 79 See WD Equip., LLC v. Cowen (In re Cowen), 849 F.3d 943, 950 (10th Cir. 2017) (ruling 
that only affirmative actions constitute violations of the automatic stay); see also supra notes 75–
78 and accompanying text. 
 80 See In re Cowen, 849 F.3d at 946 (stating that Mr. Cowen had no regular income without 
his commercial trucks); see also supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text. By allowing Mr. Wil-
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The Tenth Circuit’s decision additionally undermined the objective behind 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy itself.81 As established by the Supreme Court in Whiting 
Pools, Mr. Cowen had an equitable and possessory interest in the trucks, giving 
the bankruptcy estate a possessory right in the trucks as well.82 By depriving 
Mr. Cowen of his commercial trucks, Mr. Cowen could no longer earn any in-
come, meaning he no longer qualified for relief under Chapter 13, which de-
feats the entire purpose of providing this type of bankruptcy relief.83 
Mr. Williams’s and Mr. Dring’s duty to turn over the trucks arose as 
soon as Mr. Cowen filed for bankruptcy, and the failure to do should be 
deemed a violation of the automatic stay.84 Although secured creditors are 
entitled to “adequate protection” under § 361 of the Bankruptcy Code, this 
protection does not absolve them of their responsibility to return the asset to 
the bankruptcy estate.85 The creditors first has to return the asset to the 
debtor or bankruptcy estate, and only then may they request adequate pro-
tection from the court.86 This is supported both by the language of the 
                                                                                                                           
liams and Mr. Dring to keep the trucks, they received payment for their loan; however, that result 
disregards any other possible creditors that Mr. Cowen may have had with interests in his trucks 
or other assets. See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text. The Seventh Circuit has said that 
withholding assets from the debtor and the bankruptcy estate is a form of “exercising control” 
over such assets because the debtor can no longer benefit from the assets by putting them to use in 
running their business. Thompson v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 566 F.3d 699, 703 (7th Cir. 
2009) (quoting TranSouth Fin. Corp. v. Sharon (In re Sharon), 234 B.R. 676, 682 (B.A.P. 6th 
Cir.1999)). 
 81 See Thompson, 566 F.3d at 703, 705 (stating that the objective of Chapter 13 is to allow the 
debtor to reorganize so that they can pay off their debts without having to sell any of their assets, 
and in order to do this, the debtor has to be able to put their assets to use which they cannot do 
while the assets are in the hands of the creditor). 
 82 See United States v. Whiting Pools Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 207 (1983) (concluding that the 
turnover provision granted the estate a possessory interest in the debtor’s property, even if the 
debtor was not in possession of the property at the time that bankruptcy was filed); see also Weber 
v. SEFCU (In re Weber), 719 F.3d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 2013) (applying the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Whiting Pools to conclude that the secured property became property of the estate as soon as the 
debtor filed for bankruptcy). 
 83 See In re Cowen, 849 F.3d at 946 (stating that because Mr. Cowen could no longer use his 
trucks for his business, which was his main source of income, he no longer qualified for relief 
under Chapter 13 and his bankruptcy case was dismissed); see also supra note 81 and accompany-
ing text. 
 84 See In re Knaus, 889 F.2d at 775 (stating that regardless of whether property was repos-
sessed pre-petition or post-petition by the creditor, the duty to turn over the property to the debtor 
or the bankruptcy trustee arises as soon as the debtor files for bankruptcy). 
 85 See Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 207 (stating that the protections that are given to creditors 
by the Bankruptcy Code replace the protections that a creditor may obtain by physically pos-
sessing an asset); In re Sharon, 234 B.R. at 683 (concluding that there is no such exception where 
the creditor can rightly refuse to turn over the asset based on the idea that there was no adequate 
protection); supra note 73 (discussing “adequate protection”). 
 86 See Thompson, 566 F.3d at 703 (discussing that other circuits have held that the creditor 
has to turn over the asset first and then, after they do so, they may request adequate protection 
from the court if they desire it). 
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Bankruptcy Code and underlying policy reasons.87 Section 363(e) allows 
courts to give the creditor adequate protection; however, it must be upon the 
creditor’s request for such protection.88 Moreover, if the courts allow credi-
tors to continue possessing the property as opposed to requiring it to be 
turned over immediately, this part of the provision would be irrelevant be-
cause creditors would have no need to request protection for assets they 
already hold.89 
Looking at both policy considerations and the language of the statute, 
the Tenth Circuit incorrectly decided In re Cowen by concluding that only 
affirmative acts constitute a violation of the automatic stay.90 
CONCLUSION 
In re Cowen addressed this very important issue of whether refusal of 
turning over an asset acquired pre-petition was a violation of the automatic 
stay provision. Depending on how courts rule on this issue, a burden to act 
will fall on either the creditor or the debtor. When courts conclude that pas-
sively holding onto an asset is not a violation of the automatic stay, it puts 
the burden on debtors, as they then need to initiate an adversary proceeding 
alleging a creditor’s willful violation of the automatic stay to recover their 
assets. If courts agree that passively holding onto the asset constitutes a vio-
lation of the automatic stay, a burden is placed on creditors, who will then 
be required to return assets and subsequently request adequate protection 
from the court. A review of underlying policy reasons, legislative history, 
and plain language statutory interpretation indicates that the Tenth Circuit 
should have concluded that passive possession of an asset acquired pre-
petition was a violation of the automatic stay. The automatic stay should not 
only apply to affirmative actions, but also to passive ones as well. 
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 87 See infra notes 88–89 and accompanying text. 
 88 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (2012). 
 89 See Thompson, 566 F.3d at 704 (concluding that because not requiring the creditor to re-
quest adequate protection would make § 363(e) meaningless, Congress must have intended for the 
creditor to first turn over the property before seeking its adequate protection right). Additionally, 
the court in Thompson pointed out that allowing the creditor to continue possessing property of the 
bankruptcy estate until it has adequate protection “unfairly tips the bargaining power in favor of 
the creditor.” Id. at 707. 
 90 See supra notes 75–89 and accompanying text. 
